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Getting Older in the 21st Century
The Risks and Consequences of Disability
MarkV. Nadel 
Social Security Administration
Among the fearful risks facing workers as they get older, disability 
looms large. As insurance salespeople never tire of telling us, for 
younger workers the risk of disability is greater than the risk of death. 
It is a risk that is somewhat mitigated in that some workers can start 
drawing pensions before they are in their mid sixties and nearly all 
workers have been able to draw Social Security early retirement bene 
fits starting at age 62. Yet, until reaching the age where retirement 
income is available, workers confront an increased risk of disability as 
they age. In light of the gradual increase in the normal retirement age 
that began in January 2000 and concomitant diminution in early retire 
ment benefits, the risk to older workers of becoming disabled is a par 
ticularly timely issue. We are concerned about two groups of older 
workers: those in what is commonly regarded as the latter years of 
"normal employment age" (ages 55 to 64) who will be affected by 
changes in the Early Retirement Age benefits and those 65 and older 
who will be affected by current and proposed changes in the normal 
retirement age.
This chapter has four objectives. The first is to examine older 
workers' risk of disability, primarily the long-term disability that may 
limit or end employment for the rest of a worker's life. The second is 
to examine the risk of loss of employment resulting from disability and 
the characteristics of workers that affect that employment risk. While 
impairment does not necessarily equate to a loss of employment, being 
able to overcome the impairment and work by no means guarantees 
that anyone will give the older worker a job. Moreover, even with the 
same impairment, different individuals have very different risks of los 
ing employment or income. Third, I examine the systems of insurance 
coverage against those risks; who is insured, by whom, and how ade-
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quately? Last, I consider the public policy implications of older work 
ers' risk of disability, in particular the implications for proposals to 
raise the retirement age. In this chapter, the term impairment is used to 
mean diminished physical or mental health; disability refers to an 
impairment that results in loss of employment or serious reduction in 
income.
THE RISK OF DISABILITY
As we get older, we confront a greater risk of becoming disabled. 
Almost one quarter of older Americans report that they have a signifi 
cant disability that affects their ability to work. Data from the 1995 
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) show that 15.7 percent of 
individuals aged 55 to 64 reported that they were unable to work due to 
a disability. An additional 7 percent report that they are limited in their 
work activity by a disability. In contrast, 7.9 percent of the 45- to 54- 
year-old age group reported inability to work, but about the same pro 
portion (6.5 percent) reported limitations in work.
It should be noted at the outset that these data, while the best avail 
able, should still be viewed with caution. The findings are based on 
self-reported assessments, and it is likely that some unknown number 
of respondents prefer to ascribe their lack of work to a disability than to 
the less socially acceptable reason that they just do not want to work 
any more. If such fudging overstates the true state of disability, there is 
also a countervailing trend. Almost one million 55- to 64-year-olds 
who report that they have no disability simultaneously report that they 
are unable to work due to health reasons. This may be due to some 
people having an acute but temporary problem, and it probably 
includes a number of mentally ill individuals.
We will soon have a much better assessment of the prevalence of 
health impairments in the population. The Social Security Administra 
tion (SSA) is embarking on an ambitious survey of disability status and 
functioning in the population that will provide an estimate of the num 
ber of people in the population who are severely disabled enough to 
qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. 1
Session 1: Charting the Landscape 137
Trends
The current prevalence of disability tells us just part of the story. 
Ideally, we would want to know what this portends for older workers in 
the future, and the best way to forecast the future is to examine recent 
trends in disability.
From the time that the 1983 amendments enacting changes in the 
normal retirement age were passed, there was concern that longer life 
spans did not necessarily translate into longer work life. An important 
article by Ernest Gruenberg advanced the argument that recent medical 
successes in postponing death only resulted in the prolongation of sick 
ness (Gruenberg 1977). That concern was underscored by subsequent 
studies that pointed to evidence of deteriorating health and disability 
status among the older working-age population from the late 1960s 
through the 1970s. More recently, however, the data show a very dif 
ferent picture. Crimmins, Reynolds, and Saito (1999), using data from 
the National Health Interview Survey, analyzed trends in work ability 
and work limitations during the period 1982 to 1993 for the 50- to 69- 
year-old population. They found that in the later years of that period, 
both men and women older than the age of 61 are less likely to report 
inability to work. The size of the annual average decline in inability to 
work ranged from 40 to 70 percent for men and 50 to 70 percent for 
women. This improvement is also seen in older individuals.
Given the increase in the normal retirement age, disability trends 
for individuals older than 65 are also relevant. The trend toward better 
health is manifest for that group as well. For the 12 years between 
1982 to 1994, analyses of the National Long Term Care Survey 
(NLTCS) data have shown that the fraction of the 65- to 74-year-old 
population that is not chronically disabled grew by 2.6 percentage 
points, from 85.9 to 88.5 percent, and the fraction of the 75- to 84-year- 
olds not chronically disabled grew by 5.4 percentage points (Manton, 
Corder, and Stallard 1997). These findings support the idea that as the 
health and ability to work among older and younger retirement-age 
workers improve, increasing the age of full eligibility for Social Secu 
rity will not be as detrimental to older workers as some have argued.
However, the effect of health status is more complex than a simple 
snapshot of point-in-time impairment would indicate. A recent analy 
sis of the longitudinal Health and Retirement Survey found that it is not
138 Nadel
just poor health, but rapid declines in health ("health shocks") that 
explain retirement behavior. What we don't know is whether the pro 
portion of workers affected by the onset of such health shocks is also 
declining. Presumably, those who do retire early due to such health 
issues would be disproportionately affected by increasing the retire 
ment age.
In summary, while becoming older increases the risk of disability, 
the situation for workers is better than it was. Living longer does not 
necessarily mean living sicker, and in the aggregate, the possibility of 
longer work lives is somewhat less constrained by health concerns than 
was true a generation ago (Bound et al. 1999).
International Perspectives
The decline in disability in the United States has also been seen in 
other industrial countries. Waidmann and Manton (1998) reviewed 
studies from 10 industrial countries and found that these nations also 
recently experienced moderate to large declines in chronic disability in 
the elderly. For example, Canadian studies have shown there was a sig 
nificant increase in life expectancy free of severe disability for both 
males and females at age 65 from 1986 to 1991. In Great Britain, anal 
yses of Britain's three General Household Surveys in 1976, 1981, and 
1985 found an improvement over time in the expectation of life with 
out disability in for 65- and 75-year-olds. Also, in Italy, the Nether 
lands, and for females in Switzerland, there were relative increases in 
disability-free life expectancy (DFLE) over the respective time periods.
The reasons behind the improvement are hinted at by findings in 
France, where disability-free life expectancy at birth increased signifi 
cantly for both males and females from 1981 to 1991. For individuals 
65 and older, DFLE also increased sizably in absolute and relative 
terms for both males and females. Robine, Morrniche, and Sermet 
(1998) assessed whether declines in disability were due to delayed 
onset of morbidity or improved management of potentially disabling 
conditions once they exist. The results showed that the prevalence of 
potentially disabling conditions rose significantly between 1980 and 
1991. However, the propensity of those having these conditions to 
report themselves disabled fell (Robine, Mormiche, and Sermet 1998). 
These findings, Waidmann and Manton argued, suggest the possibility
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that the treatment or management of diseases has improved or that 
rehabilitation rates have increased.
Trends and Projections in the SSDI Program
As I discuss in more detail below, self-reported impairments are a 
far cry from qualifying for SSDI. Nonetheless, Social Security disabil 
ity awards seem to reinforce the findings of the recent survey research. 
This can be seen by looking at the percentage of older workers who are 
awarded disability benefits at different time periods. In 1975, among 
55- to 59-year-olds, the disability incidence rate (i.e., the proportion of 
workers in that age range who were determined to be disabled by 
Social Security) was 2.1 percent; by 1997, the percentage had declined 
to 1.4 percent. More notably, the incidence among workers aged 60- 
64 declined from 2.9 to 1.6 percent (Social Security Administration 
1999). This decline may be due largely to the trend toward early retire 
ment, but the administrative data do not reveal the extent to which 
older workers in declining health opt for early retirement in lieu of 
applying for DI benefits. However, an analysis of HRS data by 
Burkhauser, Couch, and Phillips (1996) found that the men who retired 
early (at age 62) do not significantly differ in the prevalence of health 
limitations from those who wait. While they caution that this does not 
mean that health is unimportant, the finding at least casts some doubt 
on the assumption that raising the retirement age will automatically 
cause a proportional response in DI applications.
While trends in self-reported impairments for older workers and DI 
award incidence rates show a slight decline, Social Security actuarial 
estimates project an increase in the proportion of the workforce on the 
rolls. This is not in contradiction to the improving health trends. 
Rather, it is a reflection of the greater trend of the aging of the popula 
tion as the baby boom bulges through middle age. An increasing pro 
portion of the population will be in the over-50 age range, with its 
higher disability incidence rates. The Social Security Actuary's inter 
mediate projections of the disability insurance incidence rate in 2008 is 
5.9 per thousand, compared with 4.7 per thousand in 1998. The esti 
mate takes into account the increase in the normal retirement age, with 
its consequent incentive for workers over 62 to seek to get on the SSDI 
rolls.
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Who Gets Impaired and How?
As we contemplate the possible effects of current and potential 
increases in retirement age, we can get a more complete understanding 
of the consequences by getting behind the aggregate figures and exam 
ining the disability status of different subgroups in the population. It is 
useful to consider the categories of disabilities affecting older workers 
and how disabilities are distributed across subgroups of older workers.
Not only are older workers more likely to be impaired, but the 
nature of the probable impairments also change over the lifespan. Fig 
ures 1, 2, and 3 show the prevalence of the three largest categories of 
disability among different age groups (Social Security Administration 
1998, p. 219). Not surprisingly, the prevalence of musculoskeletal and 
circulatory disorders rise dramatically with age. Mental disorders do 
not necessarily decrease with age in the population. Rather, the 
decreasing proportion in that category for older workers reflects the 
growth in mental impairment SSDI allowances for younger age work 
ers and the consequent larger numbers of younger works in that cate 
gory.
Age is not the only demographic characteristic for which disability 
varies. Numerous studies have documented differences in health status 
among racial and ethnic groups across the life cycle in the United 
States. For example, compared with whites, African Americans report 
higher rates of hypertension, diabetes, and arthritis, while Hispanics 
report higher rates of hypertension and diabetes and a lower rate of 
heart conditions (Kington and Smith 1997). Obviously, socioeconomic 
status must be considered in assessing the independent effect of race. 
In fact, Kington and Smith demonstrated that socioeconomic status 
plays a significant role in explaining racial and ethnic differences in the 
ability to function once a person has a chronic illness, but it plays a rel 
atively minor role in explaining differences in the prevalence of 
chronic disease. This seems to suggest that lower socioeconomic sta 
tus may lead to poorer outcomes once a disease develops because of 
such factors as reduced access to health care services.
Race and ethnicity are also related to employment. Crimmins, 
Reynolds, and Saito (1999) found that relative to non-Hispanic whites, 
African Americans are more than twice as likely to report inability to 
work. Even looking across people with the same education levels (i.e.,
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Figure 1 Distribution of SSDI Beneficiaries with Musculoskeletal System 
Diseases by Age
Under 30 30-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
Age
Figure 2 Distribution of SSDI Beneficiaries with Circulatory System 
Diseases by Age
Under 30 30-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
Age
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Figure 3 Distribution of SSDI Beneficiaries with Mental Disorders 
by Age
Under 30 30-39 60-64
controlling for education), being African American increases the likeli 
hood of being unable to work by about half. Similarly, Hispanics are 
about one and a half times more likely than non-Hispanic whites to 
have work disability; however, Hispanics' relative likelihood of being 
unable to work is about 25 percent less than that of non-Hispanic 
whites when education is controlled. For example, looking at the age 
group of particular interest, their logistic regression estimated that the 
probability of being unable to work among 62-year-old men with 10 
years of education was 26.1 for African Americans, 18.4 for whites, 
and only 14.4 for Hispanics. The pattern is similar for women.
These data are also mirrored by the composition of SSDI rolls. As 
seen in Figure 4, African Americans are at higher risk of being severely 
enough disabled to qualify for SSDI.2
AGING AND THE EMPLOYMENT RISKS OF IMPAIRMENT
This section focuses on the economic risk of disability in general 
and the risk to older workers in particular. Age clearly has an effect on
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SOURCE: Table 5.A1, Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement 1998, 
p. 185. Data for General Population: Table No. 22, Resident Population, by Race and 
Single Years of Age • 1997, U.S. Bureau of the Census.
gaining and sustaining employment. Not only are older workers more 
likely to get DI benefits, data from Social Security's New Beneficiary 
Survey show that, once on the rolls, older beneficiaries have a lower 
tendency to return to work; once working they have a higher tendency 
also to stop working (Hennessey 1997, p. 16). Age by itself, of course, 
is not the only factor limiting an individual's ability to work in the 
economy. Similarly, a medical impairment, by itself, does not neces 
sarily limit an individual's ability to work in the economy. Rather, the 
ability to work is a function of individual factors and factors in the 
environment. Figure 5 presents a simple model of the process. The 
following discussion gets below the aggregate data on disability and 
focuses on factors that either mitigate or exacerbate the risk of loss of 
employment once impairment has occurred.
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The Impact of Underlying Economic Conditions
Whether a medical impairment becomes a cause of unemployment 
is affected substantially by economic factors. First, economic incen 
tives play a critical role in the decisions of people with disabilities to 
participate in the labor force or to seek disability benefits. An individ 
ual's decision to apply for benefits is influenced by a variety of such 
factors. Examples of these factors might include the availability of 
potential sources of other income such as pensions or savings, the 
availability of health insurance and noncash benefits, and the costs 
associated with the application process (Stapleton et al. 1998).
Secondly, underlying economic conditions affect the economic risk 
of disability for workers who are already out of the labor force or who 
are laid off. Rupp and Stapleton (1995) summarized the results of 
numerous econometric studies estimating the effect of the business 
cycle on Disability Insurance (DI) applications, awards, and caseloads. 
The results varied in magnitude across these studies but remained con 
sistent in direction. The authors reported strong results in two studies 
they conducted. The first study analyzed DI applications and awards 
using 1988-1992 data; the second looked at DI initial determinations
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and initial allowance rates using 1988-1993 data. Stronger effects 
were found for applications. Specifically, they found that a 1-percent 
age-point increase in the unemployment rate resulted in a 4 percent 
growth in DI applications.
Similarly we would expect that disability insurance applications 
should fall when the economy rebounds from a recession. In fact, the 
DI application rate growth declined from a peak of 13.2 percent in 
1991 to 2.7 percent in 1994, as the economy rebounded from the reces 
sion. These results suggest that the labor market affects the number of 
workers applying for SSDI, but note that this evidence covers only a 
relatively short period of time, and the DI application rate, just as the 
DI approval rate, is also affected by changes in SSA policy and imple 
mentation practices. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to infer that 
workers with disabilities would be more likely to seek SSDI benefits 
when they have fewer alternatives in the economy.
Recent evidence indicates that the economic risk of disability does 
not occur only during economic downturns but is present even when 
the economy is robust. Burkhauser et al. (1999) evaluated how the 
1990s business cycle impacted working-age disabled people. As 
expected, they were able to quantitatively demonstrate the dispropor 
tionately negative impact the downturns in the business cycle had on 
people with disabilities relative to those without disabilities. What is 
more disturbing, however, is that employment and labor earning of 
individuals with disabilities declined over the entire 1990 business 
cycle, although less so in recovery than in recession.
Mitigating Factors
Although aging does increase the risk of disability, and the econ 
omy (expressed by the unemployment rate) can affect workers posi 
tively or negatively, there are a number of factors for the individual and 
for society that mitigate the economic risk of impairment for at least a 
segment of the workforce. For the individual, these factors might 
include employer accommodations, a supportive family, and good 
medical care. In the aggregate, two factors of particular importance are 
the changing nature of work and educational attainment.
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The changing nature of work
Whether a particular impairment results in loss of employment 
depends largely on the kind of work one is doing when disabled and 
the kind of jobs that are available. This relationship, in turn, depends 
on broader trends affecting the physical nature of work. The replace 
ment of high-paying manufacturing jobs with relatively low-paying 
service sector jobs is seen by many as an important factor in DI appli 
cation and award growth. Rupp and Stapleton (1995) suggested that in 
the short-run this trend may increase the DI application rate, as workers 
with disabilities who lose their manufacturing jobs may not find new 
work in the service sector and then apply for disability benefits. In the 
long run, however, it is thought the effect might be to reduce the num 
ber of applications, because service sector workers are less susceptible 
to disabling injuries and illnesses. Rupp and Stapleton suggested that 
these long-run effects may vary across different impairment groups. 
For example, workers with physical impairments would be less likely 
to require DI benefits, while those with mental impairments would be 
more likely to do so. If they are correct, another correlate of this differ 
ence is that as work requires greater cognitive skills, those with mental 
impairments will be less likely to retain or gain employment due to a 
lack of skill match. At the same time, those with physical impairments 
but lacking requisite cognitive skills for other reasons will also be less 
likely to be employed because of a decline in jobs requiring only phys 
ical exertion.
The importance of education
It has become a cliche to report that both income and likelihood of 
employment are positively related to levels of education but, like 
many cliches, it is true. The current economy requires higher-skilled 
workers, and while there is an undersupply of more-skilled workers, 
there is an oversupply of less-skilled workers (Bassi, Benson, and 
Cheney 1996). Accordingly, among the general population, the jobless 
rate is directly related to education. For example, the unemployment 
rate of men who were not high school graduates was 61 percent higher 
than those who were. Similarly, those whose education stopped at high 
school graduation had a jobless rate 26 percent higher than those who 
had been to college (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1998).
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The data on the relationship between education, disability, and 
employment (while controlling for other factors) is more scant (Curtis 
et al. 1998). Nonetheless, there have been studies that point to the 
importance of education in allowing persons with disabilities to con 
tinue working. For example, two-thirds of the relative reduction in 
inability to work over the time period analyzed by Crimmins, Rey 
nolds, and Saito (1999) was accounted for by the higher education 
level of the older age cohort in the most recent time period studied. 
Similarly, education level is a factor positively associated with those on 
DI going back to work (Hennessey and Muller 1995).
The good news here is that the educational level of the population 
has been rising. In 1969, 36 percent of the 35- to 45-year-old age 
cohort had less than a high school degree. In 1994, only 12 percent of 
this cohort had so limited an education. Similarly, the percentage of 
that age group having college degrees has doubled to 27 percent (Fried- 
land and Summer 1999).
INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR THE RISK OF DISABILITY
When the onset or worsening of an impairment results in the 
inability to work, workers may be covered by a combination of public 
and private benefit plans. Workers generally are covered by Social 
Security disability programs, workers compensation, and, to a much 
more limited extent, private disability insurance.
The first issue to raise in considering disability coverage is one of 
scope. Far fewer individuals receive any disability insurance income, 
public or private, than have self-reported work impairments. Using 
data from the 1994 National Health Interview Survey on Disability, 
Adler (1997) found that while 16.9 million working-age adults 
reported having a work disability, only 9.1 million received benefits 
from any disability program. Many of the respondents with self- 
reported disabilities may have only short-term disabilities or may be 
overstating their condition, but we simply do not yet know how many 
are in those categories and how many are have serious need for assis 
tance but lack benefits.
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The Protection Offered by Social Security Disability Insurance
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) is the 
broadest protection available for workers who become disabled, and it 
is the only disability insurance that the vast majority of Americans 
have. In 1998, 133.4 million workers were insured for DI benefits. To 
be disability-insured, workers over age 31 must have worked 5 of the 
last 10 years immediately preceding their period of disability.3 As of 
1997, 80 percent of the working-age population was SSDI insured, but 
the smaller proportion of younger workers who are covered lower this 
percentage. As a result of the exclusion of some categories of workers 
(such as domestics and most government workers) from Social Secu 
rity in the earlier years of the program, the percentage of covered work 
ers also trails off slightly starting with the age 50-54 cohort (Figure 6). 
This is especially true for women, probably because they were dispro 
portionately out of the labor force earlier in their lives or exempt as 
teachers (i.e., employees of local governments).
Figure 6 Age Groups that Are SSDI Insured (estimated)
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
Age
SOURCE: Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1998, p. 181.
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While most workers are covered by Social Security, the extent to 
which the SSDI program actually provides benefits in case of serious 
impairment is limited by two factors: the criteria for receiving benefits 
and the amount of those benefits relative to previous earnings.
The criteria for being awarded SSDI benefits are very stringent. 
The law defines disability as the inability to engage in any "substantial 
gainful activity" by reason of any medically determinable physical or 
mental impairment(s) which can be expected to result in death or 
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of 
not less than 12 months. Moreover, SSDI benefits generally do not 
begin until five months after the onset of the disability. Many more 
individuals apply for DI benefits than actually receive them. At latest 
count, approximately 49 percent of applicants are ultimately awarded 
benefits either initially or through the final administrative appeal.
Once awarded, the SSDI benefit amount, like retirement benefits, 
is related to earnings, but is also progressive. That is, the more you 
have earned, the more you get in benefits, but lower-wage workers 
receive an amount that represents a higher proportion of the predisabil- 
ity earnings than higher-wage workers. The benefits and replacement 
rate for a 50-year-old worker at different income levels is shown in 
Table 1. Note that individuals on SSDI may earn up to $700 per month 
and not lose any benefits. Benefits are generally also paid to spouses 
when there is a dependent child and also to those children. In 1997, 
those benefits averaged $178 to wives and $129 to husbands. Children 
received an average of $195 ($292 if they were also disabled).
Table 1 Earnings Replacement Rates for Steady Workers Entitled to 
SSDI (1998)a
Earnings 
















a For a 50-year-old worker at four levels of covered earnings.
b Shown for illustrative purposes. Benefits are paid on a monthly basis.
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Accounting for Age
The connection between age and disability is inherent in the Social 
Security Disability program. The initial cash benefit program estab 
lished in the Social Security Amendments of 1956 provided benefits 
only for disabled insured workers who were between the ages of 50 
and 65. The House Ways and Means Committee Report on the legisla 
tion stated
retirement protection for the 70 million workers under old-age and 
survivors insurance is incomplete because it does not now provide 
a lower retirement age for those who are demonstrably retired by 
reason of a permanent and total disability. We recommend the 
closing of this serious gap in the old-age and survivors insurance 
system by providing for the payment of retirement benefits at age 
50 to those regular workers who are forced into premature retire 
ment because of disability.
Thus, disability insurance was conceived of as a necessary early retire 
ment program for older workers.
In 1960, Congress removed the minimum age requirement of 50 
years for disability insurance beneficiaries. Nonetheless, the Social 
Security Administration considers age to be a significant factor in the 
disability decision process. It is not that age makes an individual more 
disabled; rather, the agency's assumption is that people in the latter 
stages of work life who have impairments are less likely to be able to 
adjust to new employment opportunities. To understand the place that 
age plays in disability determination, it is useful to review briefly how 
SSA determines that an individual is disabled for purposes of receiving 
SSDI. SSA uses a five-step sequential evaluation process (Figure 7).
It is at step five determining whether there are other jobs the indi 
vidual can perform that age comes into account, as required by the 
Social Security Act. For younger persons (under age 50), SSA does 
not consider that age will seriously affect one's ability to adapt to a 
new work situation. Social Security regulations state that "if you are 
closely approaching advanced age (50-54) we will consider that your 
age, along with a severe impairment and limited work experience, may 
seriously affect your ability to adjust to a significant number of jobs in 
the national economy." "Advanced age" (55 or over) is that point
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Figure 7 Social Security Sequential Disability Decision-Making Process
1 Is the applicant engaging in substantial gainful activity? 
(Earning more than $700/month) 
No Yes —> Deny
2. Does the applicant have severe impairment(s) that limits
basic work activities? 
Yes No  ^ Deny
Is the impairment expected to last 12 months or result in death? 
Yes No —*• Deny
3. Does the impairment meet or equal the medical listings7 
Allow •<———— Yes No
(Assess residual functional capacity)
4. Does the impairment prevent doing past work?
Yes No ——^ Deny
I 
(Consider the applicant's age, education and work expenence)
5. Does the impairment prevent any other work
that exists in the national economy? 
Allow -4———— Yes No ——>• Deny
where SSA regards age as significantly affecting a person's ability to 
perform substantial gainful activity.
Both the increasing numbers of workers in the older age ranges and 
the impact of the easing of standards for them in step five can be seen 
in the proportion of persons who successfully apply for DI benefits 
(Table 2).
The Protection Offered by Supplemental Security Income
As the name implies, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) pro 
gram supplements the coverage provided by SSDI. As a means-tested 
program, it does so in two ways. First, it provides disability benefits to 
individuals who are not covered by SSDI. For individuals who meet 
the low income and assets test, the sequential evaluation to determine 
whether they are disabled for Social Security purposes is the same as it
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Table 2 SSDI Awards and Applications by Age, 1997a
Applications allowed 













SOURCE: Social Security Administration unpublished data.
a Both applications and awards are the total of first-time and reapphcations.
is for SSDI. Secondly, even for individuals who are receiving SSDI but 
whose benefits are very low (currently below $500 a month), SSI pro 
vides supplemental coverage with a total benefit somewhat higher than 
$500 a month. Last year, 5.3 million persons received SSI on the basis 
of a disability.4 Currently, out of 6.3 million SSDI beneficiaries, 1.6 
million receive SSI as well. In addition to federal benefits, 44 states 
also provide additional benefits. Unlike SSDI, every dollar of earnings 
after the first $65 a month results in a 50-cent reduction in SSI benefits.
The Increased Retirement Age
In reviewing Social Security coverage for disability, we cannot 
look only at the DI and SSI programs. Medicare and retirement bene 
fits must also be considered as part of the protection available to work 
ers who become disabled.
Medicare is provided to persons who have received SSDI benefits 
for two years. While health insurance is obviously an important issue 
for any adult, it is particularly important for persons with disabilities 
because there is substantial evidence that they are at greater risk for 
additional health complications (Marge 1998). Individuals who get 
SSI benefits then get Medicaid immediately rather than having to wait 
for Medicare. Medicaid, ironically, can be more useful to these indi 
viduals because, unlike Medicare, it provides prescription drug cover 
age.
Social Security retirement benefits are also closely linked to work 
ers' financial status if they become disabled. Workers on DI automati 
cally transition to retirement benefits upon reaching 65 years of age,
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but that retirement age is gradually increasing to 67. To the extent that 
individuals retire early due to poor health, the current increase in the 
normal retirement age and the eventual reduction in the amount of ben 
efits from 80 to 70 percent of normal retirement for those workers who 
retire at 62 is an incentive for more workers to seek SSDI. The amount 
of SSDI benefits would be comparable to their normal retirement bene 
fit. If they can get SSDI, they then convert at the normal retirement age 
to whatever their full Social Security retirement benefit would be and 
never suffer a reduction in benefits. GAO (1999) argued that while 
future increases in the retirement age would result in net trust fund sav 
ings, there would be some increase in disability insurance payments. 
However, for workers who were in poor health but could not meet the 
strict disability standards of SSDI, they would either have to continue 
to work until normal retirement age or accept a reduced retirement ben 
efit. In short, the Social Security retirement age affects how workers 
mitigate the risk of disability as they age.
However, the relationship between health and retirement plans may 
not be as simple as is sometimes assumed. As noted above, HRS data 
indicate that the men who retired early (at age 62) do not significantly 
differ in the prevalence of health limitations from those who wait 
(Burkhauser, Couch, and Phillips 1996). The Congressional Budget 
Office (1999) also found that only 8 percent of men and 11 percent of 
women who took early retirement had non-Social Security income 
below the poverty line and a work-related disability. This may suggest 
that only a small proportion of early retirees are rendered extremely 
dependent on early Social Security benefits retirement by virtue of both 
disability and income.
Insuring against Workplace Injury—Workers Compensation
While the Social Security Disability Insurance system covers 
workers with severe disabilities regardless of how they developed those 
disabilities, workers' compensation (WC) insurance is a nearly univer 
sal system to provide reimbursement of wages and expenses for work 
ers who become disabled as a result of their job. WC will be discussed 
only briefly here.
Private insurance companies provide WC insurance, but it is not an 
entirely private system. Employers are generally required to provide
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the insurance, but its existence also protects employers from legal lia 
bility. WC began in the early 1900s and now has separate programs for 
each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Since the basic goal 
of WC is to restore workers to their previous abilities, the programs 
strongly emphasize rehabilitation. WC is fully funded by employers. 
Benefits include a weekly amount until maximum medical improve 
ment has been realized, with payments thereafter based on the degree 
of disability; medical care is also covered. Benefit payments, which 
include both cash payments and medical care, totaled $42.4 billion in 
1996.
Insuring against Disability—Private Plans
While Social Security provides financial protection for workers 
who become severely disabled over the long term and workers com 
pensation provides coverage for those who become injured or sick on 
the job, private disability insurance falls between these systems. It 
should be noted at the outset that private plans are not independent of 
Social Security; they developed in a climate that already included 
Social Security and other public benefits. The private plans assumed 
the existence of Social Security and generally are tailored to integrate 
with it, by offsetting their benefits by the amount of Social Security 
benefits. Private disability plans are broadly divided into two catego 
ries, short-term and long-term, but beyond that there is great variety 
and no standard terminology.
The definitions of disability within the types of plans vary to some 
extent, but they generally share major characteristics. Short-term plans 
typically cover impairments that are judged to prevent employees from 
engaging in their usual occupation. They generally pick up workers 
after sick pay is exhausted, although the plan may be in lieu of sick pay. 
Benefit periods generally range from 30 days to six months. Nearly all 
employees who end up getting short-term benefits return to work within 
two months. Others may, if they are covered, "graduate" to long-term 
disability coverage. Generally, long-term plans are more restrictive, 
particularly after the first two years. While they initially provide pay 
ments for employees unable to perform their usual occupation, after 
two years the definition usually requires the employee to be unable to 
perform any occupation. The earnings replacement rate of these long-
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term plans is about 60 percent, up to a contractual maximum dollar 
amount. However, this generally includes any SSDI payments.
Private plans provide a useful measure of protection. The problem 
is that relatively few workers are covered. According to Bureau of 
Labor Statistics data, about 40 percent of full-time workers have short- 
term policies, and about one-third of workers have employer-provided 
long-term policies. As shown in Figure 8, workers in smaller firms are 
less likely to have long-term policies. Note that blue-collar workers in 
all categories of employers are the least likely to have long-term dis 
ability insurance. That is, workers in the most arduous occupations are 
least likely to be covered.
Individually purchased disability plans are also available, but we 
were unable to obtain data on participation rates for such plans. They 
are, however, mostly limited to highly compensated employees or self- 
employed individuals. These plans may replace up to 80 percent of 
earnings, though more typical replacement rates are 60-70 percent. 
Often these plans do not offset payments by the amount of Social Secu 
rity benefits.










SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics 1997 Employee Benefits Survey.
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As with individual and small-group health insurance, the disability 
income insurance market is heavily underwritten. The workers we are 
concerned about here, with their greater risk of disability, would likely 
be deemed uninsurable or face extremely high premium payments. 
Thus for most workers, especially most blue-collar and small-firm 
employees, Social Security is the only game in town.
The extent of coverage and the resulting economic risk of disabil 
ity-related employment loss can be put in perspective by comparison 
with other countries, even though comparisons are inexact due to 
broader definitions of disability in other nations and the use of disabil 
ity rolls to cover more general unemployment. First, a higher propor 
tion of the working-age population is receiving disability insurance 
benefits in most European countries. Second, the economic well-being 
of men with disabilities in the United States is often not equal to their 
counterparts in those other countries. Burkhauser and Daly (1998) 
made this point by comparing the experience of U.S. and German men. 
Using cross-sectional data, they found that the average-income Ger 
man who has a disability lives in a household which has an income that 
is virtually the same as that of the average German without a disability. 
In contrast, the income gap in the United States between those with and 
without disabilities is approximately 25 percent. Additionally, in Ger 
many the pre-tax and transfer income (composed largely of own wage 
earnings) of men with disabilities is nearly 80 percent of that of men 
without disabilities, whereas in the United States the pre-tax and trans 
fer income gap for men is almost 35 percent.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY ISSUES
Older may be wiser, but it often is also weaker. For the individual, 
the story is mixed. While any given individual is far more likely to be 
impaired in the second half of work life than in the first, the good news 
is that that individual is likely to be somewhat healthier than his coun 
terpart of 20 years ago. For the social insurance system, however, the 
improvements in health and functioning are still going to be trumped 
by increased number of people in their late fifties and early sixties. It
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could have been worse, but demographic factors still present three key 
policy problems having to do with distributional issues.
The first problem is that health status is not randomly distributed in 
the population. Minorities and those with low educational levels are 
more likely to have impairments affecting their employment. What 
ever the covariance and root causes of the unequal health status of 
minorities, under present trends, minorities will constitute a dispropor 
tionate number of those with health impairments at the same time that 
they are becoming a larger proportion of the general population.
The second problem is that the impact of disability on employment 
is concentrated. Those with higher educational status are both less 
likely to need to leave a job due to impairment and more likely to 
regain employment after losing it because of disability. This factor 
also reinforces the problem facing minority groups.
Finally, just as workers are admonished to have private pensions 
and savings in addition to Social Security (completing the famous 
three-legged stool), SSDI provides a benefit level that does not hold 
workers harmless in the event of disability. The replacement rate is 
less than 50 percent for most workers. However, while most people 
have at least short legs on their stool for retirement, a similar supple 
ment to Social Security Disability Insurance is generally not available. 
We do not know the size of the assets of SSDI beneficiaries, but since 
their average income tends to be low, it is very unlikely that their sav 
ings are of much help when they become disabled. Similarly, private 
long-term disability insurance covers only about one-third of workers. 
Like employer-provided health insurance, it tends to be offered to 
workers who are already better off. In short, the health risk to the older 
population is not randomly distributed, and the consequences of 
impairment add additional risk to traditionally disadvantaged groups.
In addition to the aging baby boomers, the other contextual issue 
for assessing disability is the currently scheduled and potential 
increases in the retirement age-. While we know that many people pre 
fer to take Social Security retirement benefits at age 62, raising that age 
will not affect as high a proportion of workers with impairments as 
would have been true 20 years ago. Nonetheless, that trend will be 
scant comfort to those who seek to retire early for health reasons but 
whose impairments do not meet SSDI criteria. We are still learning 
more about their numbers and characteristics, but suffice it to say for
158 Nadel
now that there will be groups that will be worse off if they must defer 
retirement beyond the current early retirement age or take further 
reductions in retirement benefits.
The current policy response to the increased prevalence of disabil 
ity among older workers is to make it relatively easier for older work 
ers to be awarded SSDI. To the extent that workers are required to 
work longer to receive retirement benefits, additional options may be 
considered. These would include modifying (i.e., easing) the sequen 
tial evaluation system for older workers, allowing a partial disability 
benefit for older workers, or lowering the Medicare eligibility age to 
reduce health costs for workers forced to retire on reduced benefits. 
These are all expensive propositions, but nonetheless, the impact on 
older workers in fragile health must be considered as we examine pol 
icy options to improve the solvency of the system.
Notes
Mark V. Nadel is Associate Commissioner, Office of Disability and Income Assistance 
Policy, Social Security Administration. This paper was written with the assistance of 
Stephane Philogene. Howard Bradley also provided useful help. I appreciate com 
ments from Jane Ross, Eli Donkar, Kalman Rupp, and Michael Marge. The views 
expressed in this paper are entirely my own and do not necessarily represent the posi 
tion of the Social Security Administration.
1. The National Study of Health and Activity will do medical examinations and 
functional assessments and collect other data from a sample of 5,500 working-age 
individuals, most of whom will have been previously screened to get a sample of 
individuals with some degree of impairment. SS A disability examiners will deter 
mine whether individuals not now on the roles would qualify for benefits on the 
basis of impairment.
2. The disability and survivors insurance features of Social Secunty are particularly 
important to blacks. While a smaller proportion of all black beneficiaries receive 
retirement benefits than do whites, a larger proportion of black beneficiaries 
receive DI benefits than do whites (25 percent for blacks compared to 12 percent 
for whites). See Hendley and Bihmoria (1999).
3. To be insured for DI, workers under age 65 must 1) be fully insured and 2) have 
recent covered earnings, as follows. Workers age 31 and over must have covered 
earnings in at least 20 of their last 40 quarters ending with the quarter in which the 
worker became disabled. Workers who become disabled before age 31 may meet 
an alternative to the 20/40 test: younger workers must have quarters of coverage 
equal to at least half of the quarters in the period between the quarter of attain-
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ment of age 21 and the quarter of onset of disability. (Any odd number of quarters 
in that period is rounded off by one.) Even the youngest workers, however, must 
have a minimum of 6 quarters. Workers who meet statutory blindness require 
ments need only be fully insured and need not meet the second requirements for 
recent earnings.
4. SSI can also be paid, if the low income and asset test is met, to the aged (65+) and 
to children with disabilities
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